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Statutes That Are Not Static – 
The Case of the APA
Peter L. Strauss*
... [T]he lesson of the past two hundred years is that we will do well to be on our
guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. As lawyers we will
do well to be on our guard against any suggestion that, through law, our society can
be reformed, purified, or saved. The function of law, in a society like our own, is
altogether more modest and less apocalyptic. It is to provide a mechanism for the
settlement of disputes in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose
soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus among us. If the
assumption is wrong, if there is no consensus, then we are headed for war, civil
strife, and revolution, and the orderly administration of justice will become an
irrelevant, nostalgic whimsy until the social fabric has been stitched together again
and a new consensus has emerged. But, so long as the consensus exists, the
mechanism which the law provides is designed to insure that our institutions adjust
to change, which is inevitable, in a continuing process which will be orderly,
gradual, and, to the extent that such a thing is possible in human affairs, rational.
The function of the lawyer is to preserve a skeptical relativism in a society hell-bent
for absolutes. When we become too sure of our premises, we necessarily fail in what
we are supposed to be doing.
When we think of our own or of any other legal system, the beginning of wisdom lies
in the recognition that the body of the law, at any time or place, is an unstable mass
in precarious equilibrium. The study of our legal past is helpful to lawyers and
judges and legislators in the same way that the study of recorded games is helpful
to a chess player. But the principal lesson to be drawn from our study is that the part
of wisdom is to keep our theories open-ended, our assumptions tentative, our
reactions flexible. We must act, we must decide, we must go this way or that. Like the
blind men dealing with the elephant, we must erect hypotheses on the basis of
inadequate evidence. That does no harm—at all events it is the human condition from
which we will not escape—so long as we do not delude ourselves into thinking that
we have finally seen our elephant whole.1
Judges interpreting statutes evidence a certain ambivalence whether they are interpreting the texts
before them as artifacts whose meaning was fixed as of their date of enactment, or as present-day
texts whose meaning may be shaped by subsequent events – whether intervening judicial decisions,
2  435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150  (1999).
3  463 U.S. 29 (1983).
4  See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987).
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or the adoption of new statutes (as distinct from amendments, an easy case) whose instructions bear
on the issues they present.  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council2 stridently referred the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking provision
back to the political compromise struck at its enactment in 1946; the opinion insisted that judges are
not free to vary its terms by common-law improvisations based on their reasoning about the
procedural needs of contemporary rulemaking.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs’ Assn v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co.3 almost as impatiently dismissed the argument that judicial standards for reviewing agency
rulemakings are those that prevailed when the APA was enacted (equating review of rulemaking
with highly permissive review of economic legislation), rather than the “hard look” understandings
that had grown up in the 1970s, primarily in the D.C. Circuit.  The particular tension has long been
a puzzle for administrative law scholars; yet it seems to reflect a general unease about how judges
ought best interpret Congress’s words as they age.  
This essay is offered as a modest contribution to these debates.  Reflecting Gilmore’s epigram
at the head of these pages, it argues that in its very occasional4 forays into the construction of
particular statutes, whenever the Supreme Court is considering a return to original understandings
it should accord substantial weight to contemporary consensus the profession and lower courts have
been able to develop in interpreting law.  Drawing as well on a similar tension in the writings of
5  See TAN infra.
6  Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,101 Mich.L.Rev. 885 (2003).
7  At 905.
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Dean Roscoe Pound,5 it suggests that judges might usefully distinguish between  congressional
preferences reflected in subsequent statutes, and their own preferences developed in and through the
common law.  Vermont Yankee repudiated common-law development of the APA’s required
rulemaking procedures on the basis simply of judicial preferences or sensibilities, but that need not
entail a  repudiation of developments grounded in subsequently enacted statutes.  From this
perspective, it is argued, one could regard a move that understands earlier statutes in the light shed
by later ones as statutory interpretation, not common-law innovation.  From this perspective, such
a move, linking judicial to demonstrable congressional preferences, is the less problematic.
I. Theory: Considering the Congressional-Judicial Dialog
Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have recently demonstrated at length that
considerations of institutional capacity, and of the possible dynamic effects of a chosen approach on
the future behaviors of the institutions concerned, are central to any inquiry about statutory
interpretation.6  That is, one must analyze the place and functioning both of legislators and of their
possible interpreters; one must do so in the framework both of the ends of the legal system –
predictability of general outcome and justice in individual cases – and of the dynamic workings of
the political order within which they operate.  And one must do so free of “the nirvana fallacy – the
juxtaposition of an idealized picture of [one institution’s] capacities with a grudging picture of the
capacities of other actors in the interpretive system.”7  Their ostensible critic and sometime colleague
8  Richard A. Posner, The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation. 101 Mich.L.Rev.
952, 961 (2003).
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Judge Posner, basically agreeing with their root propositions, has reminded us that in this most real
of all possible worlds, one must perform these analyses in relation to the actualities of the American
political system, not some idealized or hypothetically possible alternative.  Interpretation is at best
a secondary characteristic of that system.  It cannot be choices about statutory interpretation styles
or their dynamic effects, he argues, that have been
the cause of our tricameral legislative system (tricameral because the veto power makes the
President in effect a third house of Congress), our 200-year-old Constitution whose authors
were sages but not seers, our federal system that overlays federal law on the legal systems
of fifty different states, our weak, undisciplined political parties, [our long acceptance of the
use of common law processes as appropriate means for defining legal duties], our system of
appointing or electing judges from other branches of the legal profession, including the
academic branch, rather than making judging a career, and the division of governmental
powers between the legislative and executive branches. In a [typical European] parliamentary
system [judging is a lifetime career,] the executive is selected by and answerable to the
legislature, which usually is effectively unicameral. The result is a very great centralization
of government power, which the United States lacks ... . [These differences are] not because
of [our choices regarding] statutory and constitutional construction by judges ... .8 
That is, attention to the institutional capacities of interpreters and writers, and of the dynamic
interactions between them, must occur within the framework of the political institutions and culture
we share; and, as Judge Posner points out, such attention has long characterized the literature.
Fully accepting the necessity for institutional/dynamic analysis of statutory interpretation, this
essay seeks to place it in a context that honors three additional considerations: our long-standing
political acceptance of judicial lawmaking (i.e., commonlaw processes and the associated system of
stare decisis); our democratic commitment to the political superiority of legislation; and the
proposition that both legislation and caselaw development are primarily self-regarding.  That is, to
9  Compare Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of Interpretive Theory, Chicago
Public Law and Legal Theory W orking Paper No. 49 , http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=449860 (visited November 23, 2003).
Vermeule persuasively calls attention to the difficulties presented if one assumes that a judicial approach to interpretation
that would be desirable if all judges adopted it for all time is therefore desirable for each individual judge (since we can
understand that not all judges will adopt identical interpretive approaches, at any one time or, especially, across time),
the fallacy of division; and, conversely, that an approach that might be desirable for a particular judge at a particular time
is therefore desirable for all judges at all times (since the attractiveness of the approach for the individual judge may lie
precisely in the balance it offers to an empirically unstable mix of approaches), the fallacy of composition.  Arguably,
however, Vermeule overstresses the legislative-judicial interface, as if it were primary to  the functioning of both
institutions; he is insufficiently attentive to the ways in which a common law culture works within the judiciary to
produce approximate concord in relation to judicial law-making tasks, and the ways in which a culture of legislating
works to similar  ends within legislatures.  
That both cultures could be corroded – prove unreliab le – is undeniable,and one can certainly point to indicators
that it is occurring – the discipline of precedent and commitment to consistency being arguably overwhelmed as courts
of appeal assert the luxury of rendering decisions that they prohibit counsel from relying upon and testing in future
litigation, even as empirical indicators of partisan patterns of decision appear, see Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and
Lisa Michelle E llman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: a Preliminary Investigation,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/resources/50.crs.voting.pdf, (visited Nov. 26, 2003); the
accountability of legislative behaviors similarly disappears in the face of thousand-page statutory drafts presented without
realistic opportunity for reading much less debate, filled with special interest provisions for which no legislator may be
willing to acknowledge responsibility.   Yet this possibility could hardly be a matter of indifference to any member of
our polity; and Vermeule’s approach risks suggesting that this outcome is objectively inevitable, and not subject to
influence by social and cultural norms.  Cf.  Peter L. Strauss, Educating Citizens, 87 Corn.L.Rev. 690 (2002).
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expand briefly upon the third of these, legislators are primarily concerned with influencing the
legislative and not the judicial process; and judges, correspondingly, are primarily concerned in their
lawmaking with the internal habits and constraints of judicial, not legislative, process.  That
legislators may cock an eye to how judges behave, and vice versa, is secondary to their culture.9  In
the system of stare decisis, judges draw on the past decisions of hierarchically superior courts when
reasoning by analogy in unprovided cases; save in the most extraordinary of circumstances, they
predict the future only from these past deposits of action – not, as such, what they think a superior
court likely to do, independent of these indicators.  Similarly it is in the nature of a court to draw on
the past actions of the (hierarchically superior) legislature in reasoning to a conclusion about a matter
not clearly provided for, rather than to predict, as such, what the contemporary legislature might be
expected to do about the matter.  The greater volatility of legislatures makes this conventional
10  For an unusually attentive (and unanimous) Supreme Court opinion in this respect, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., ___ U.S. ___ (May 3, 2004).
11  Legislatures may fail to act not only because judges have correctly identified the policies that would actually be
enacted, but merely because they have found a decision point within the area of slack legislative veto-gates provide.  See
See, e.g., Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 (1994) and TAN infra.
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judicial regard for the significance of past resolutions and instructions the more important.  Policies
that have been established, not those that might be, are the central consideration.
The institutional/dynamic perspective captures a certain dialogic quality in the workings over
time of legislatures and courts.  Whether by common-law reasoning alone or by interpretation, courts
develop law by the percolation and development of principle through hierarchically organized
judicial systems that bring uncertainties into increasingly focused and prominent view.  Legislatures
similarly respond to social controversies which rise to the surface.  Outside the special ambit of
constitutional concerns, which will not trouble us here, legislative modification (one might say,
correction) of common law or interpretive results has a conversational quality.10  Even assuming a
certain legislative volatility and the slack created by institutional obstacles to new legislation,11 one
would expect judicial responsiveness to legislative signals to generate less new legislative business
than judicial resistance to them, or even ignoring of them.  Low levels of legislative effort to modify
judicial outcomes signal judicial success from this institutional perspective; when levels of effort are
high, when it appears that Congress repeatedly works to modify or correct judicial outcomes in a
given area of concern, that may be taken as a sign of institutional failure.  Given the normative
superiority of legislative over judicial output, I suggest, patterns of repeated struggle between
legislators and interpreters ordinarily suggest interpretive failure; patterns of acceptance of
12  Note 9 supra.  These are proposed measures of system dynamics only, not of justice achieved.  Nazi judges may
have interpreted German statutes in ways that extended their anti-semitic reach considerably; but there is no sign that
the German government or (at the time) Volk found this objectionable.  Conversely, some judges in apartheid  South
Africa employed formalist techniques to frustrate its legislation; this normatively praiseworthy, even heroic activity was,
from a systemic, institutional perspective – and the perspective of the Boers who then dominated South Africa’s political
institutions – highly inappropriate.
13  The point is put in this guarded way to recognize that in some contexts, such as citizenship issues, courts
recognizing plenary congressional authority have nonetheless developed widely accepted interpretive approaches
favoring quasi-constitutional individual claims.  E .g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).  One could think
that in these cases courts are responding to primary norms of justice, rather than systemic considerations, cf. n. 12 above.
In Girouard, for example, the majority relies on strong, constitutionally grounded First Amendment values in overruling
prior statutory interpretations that (because they dealt with immigration and citizenship) were concededly within
Congress’s power; the dissent, written by a Justice who had dissented fervently from the initial statutory readings, relied
on the institutional consideration that Congress had had the Court’s earlier rulings forcefully called to its attentions, had
had several occasions to correct any error, and in reenacting the language concerned  had failed to do so. 
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interpretive outputs, albeit less strongly, success.12
Scholars writing about judges interpreting statutes disagree about much, yet generally agree on
some propositions.  Apart from questions of constitutionality, few assert that judges are superior or
even equal law-makers to the legislature.  Propositions embodied in legislation must dominate
judicial preferences.  Courts fighting or displacing legislative judgments, unless warranted by such
concerns as ordinarily we associate with the Constitution,13 are acting beyond their proper sphere.
In an ideal state, judicial interpretations would never, in themselves, perturb legislative deliberations.
In the ongoing back-and-forth between the rule-generation that is legislation and rule-application that
is adjudication, the appliers’ success in implementing the instructions they have received would be
reflected in a lack of need for reiteration of the instructions.  A metaphor of “faithful servant” is
often used; and that metaphor does not fit an actor constantly quarreling with, manipulating, or
second-guessing her instructions, or imposing on them linguistic preferences that are personal to the
14  “Like a union that works to rule, a judge who uses the methodology of strict textualism steps out of the proper
subordinate status to unfaithfully frustrate the legislation that the judge is institutionally bound to further.  Strict
textualism reflects not the obedience that the court owes to the legislature, but an improper and indeed arrogant move
by a subordinate to assume a role that is equal or even dominant to that of his master.”  Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict
Textualism, 29 Loyola of L.A. L. Rev. 13, 37-38 (1995); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70
U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 250-52 (1999).  None of this is to deny that there may be extraordinary circumstances in which
the judge’s obligations to higher principle command such obstructionism, cf. n. 12 above, but in such circumstances there
must be reasons that command disobedience.
15  Gerard E. Lynch, “What Judges Do, Part I,” in Peter L. Strauss, Cases and Materials on Legal Methods 644 (prov.
ed. 2003).
16  That is, the legislature is a multitude not an ind ividual, hardly capable of having either an objective single
intention or an objective single understanding regarding the texts it adopts, even before we begin to consider the further
complications introduced by bicameralism and the usual need for executive approval.  See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863-870-71 (1930).
17  Consider, for example, massive omnibus budget reconciliation legislation reaching the floor of Congress in
unreadable reams of assembled papers, into which members have often enough slipped important – or trivial –
provisions.  Cf. Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 , 866 and 867 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting 1986).
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servant rather than a fair reflection of the master’s usage.14  The properly subordinate status of judges
in this respect is not at issue.
The “faithful servant” metaphor may express the inferiority of judicial lawmaking, the necessary
subordination of judicial judgment to legislative instructions, but it is imperfect in a number of
important respects.  Inevitably (because time is a limited resource and because language and
foresight are imperfect), and sometimes not to their credit (that is, to avoid resolving problems they
actually do identify but choose for political or other reasons not to deal with), legislatures “write with
stubby crayons.”15  A good deal of that imprecision is attributable to the fact that, as many have
pointed out, describing a legislature as “a” master is incoherent;16 the United States Congress acts
through the votes of its 535 members, whose agreement even on the language it enacts is never better
than formal.17    As important, the judicial servant has no continuing relationship with the enacting
body, through which understandings might emerge over time; its original master has departed the
scene.  The legislature that writes goes out of session, and the judges who apply its instructions
18  And, as Melvin Eisenberg has noted, the similar questions that arise in the context of the private “law” created
by contract.  The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 Calif.L.Rev. 1745, 1749 (2000).
19  The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton); that, empirically, one may doubt the completeness of the separation across
many if not all arenas of legal dispute, see Sunstein et al., n. ? above, does not undercut the aspiration or its normative
thrust.. 
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generally do so while a different legislature is sitting; in the interim, legislative politics may have
changed, new and unforeseen problems may have arisen, and the general legal framework may also
have changed, as by the enactment of new statutes.  The actions of this new legislature are influenced
by contemporary politics – importantly including the usual necessity of securing presidential or
gubernatorial support for any new legislation, as well as overcoming the many internal barriers that
may be raised to success.  Perhaps most important, then, is that the judiciary’s new nominal
“master” is limited in its possibilities for response.  The friction in the legislative system makes it
likely that a range of possible judicial interpretations of the existing legislation will be left
undisturbed – that is, today’s legislators will not succeed in forming the coalitions necessary to
successful legislative business for all deviations from their constructive wishes, but only some of
them.  Judges cannot be controlled by the enacting legislature (which no longer exists); and they
have effective power to deviate to some degree from the instructions a contemporary legislature
would hypothetically give them. 
How, then, is one to maintain the ethos of judicial subservience?  Perhaps it is appropriate to
begin by noticing an artificiality in the question, later returned to – that it focuses attention on
interpretation to the exclusion of other judicial law-declaring functions, notably those associated with
the common law.18  Separating the realms of “[judicial] judgment” and “[political] Will”19 is a
general problem in relation to a judiciary entrusted with resolving legal questions not yet answered,
in a manner that will command the future.  The general resolution, satisfying or not, is framed self-
20  See John Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997).  This essay is not
the place in which to explore the continuing arguments over the proper place (if any) of legislative history in statutory
interpretation, and so  does not engage Prof. Manning’s extensive scholarship on textualsim, as such.  See also , e.g.,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2001).  The statement in text should not be taken as a
statement about the frequency with which participants in legislative processes attempt to influence judges and other
outsiders through legislative history, relative to their efforts to influence those processes themselves.  Many have
remarked on the institutional purposes served by legislative history, and the institutional safeguards favoring internally-
regarding uses.  Internally-regarding legislative history materials can illuminate the “masters’” understanding of an
adopted text, revealing problems identified, considerations addressed (and overlooked), understood purposes and
expected effects, etc.   See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 U.S.C.
L. Rev. 845 (1992).  Yet one can deny neither the possibility of manipulative (i.e., externally-regarding) uses nor the
added incentives given for such manipulation by close judicial attention to the resulting materials.
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referentially, in relation to the culture and obligations of judges and judging rather than their
connections to any external institution – whether to the legislature or directly to the people in some
political sense.  Nonetheless, legislative creation of a text is conventionally taken to frame the issue
in a distinctive way, and for the moment at least this essay will proceed in that light. 
In asking how the ethos of subservience to the legislature (legitimately expressed political will)
may be maintained, it is perhaps appropriate to note that perceptions that the courts had been failing
to do so animated the constitutional crises of the New Deal ... and resulted in the adoption, for a
time, of apologetic techniques of interpretation so assiduous in their attention to the details of
congressional business as arguably to corrupt the legislative process.  By elevating the importance
of legislative history materials, the courts encouraged participants in the legislative process to
attempt to achieve through the creation of “legislative history” ends that they may not have had the
capacity to shepherd through the legislative obstacle course of bicameralism and presentment.20  This
outcome – reaction to which substantially explains the present judicial caution in using legislative
history materials – suggests the importance of the interactive quality of the judicial-legislative
relationship.  Legislatures learn from the techniques judges use, and adapt their approaches to them,
21  Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 69 U.Chi.L.Rev. 149 (2001).
22  In Judge Posner’s words, “the irresponsible judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires
and the stupid judge will do the same thing unconsciously.”  Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev.
800, 817 (1983).  It is hardly my purpose to substitute for the “nirvana fantasy,” text at n. 7 above, however, the cynical
proposition that judges and legislators will inevitably pursue ends more selfish than the culture in which they have grown
up prepares them for.  See Educating Citizens, n. 9 above.  Granted that we must prepare for the reality that men are not
angels, James A. Madison, The Federalist #51, to assume that we must have so selfish a state is to invite that state.
23  The Supreme Court has given this proposition particularly emphatic form, Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284
(1996).  This is not a necessary outcome; judges in civil law systems profess a much looser attitude toward their earlier
readings of statutory text.  Yet the  habitual disciplines of common law courts make it an understandable one.
24  Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902), reversed 196 U.S. 1 (1904), is a classic example
from the United States’ earlier formalist period, cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1133 ff. (Eskridge & Frickey eds. 1994) ; more  recen tly, the Court-
congressional struggles over reimbursement of prevailing party expenses in public interest litigation, such as West
Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), cf. Philip Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn.L.Rev. 241, 264-67 (1992) and Alexander Aleinikoff and
Theodore Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45  Vand.L.Rev. 687 (1992); see also Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins.  Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204  (2002).
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and vice versa.21  
No technique judges might use in interpretation will either defeat this dialogic quality or
eliminate the area of slack created by the institutional/political obstacles to legislation , which an
unprincipled judge might exploit to pursue private ends.22  Take, for example, the ostensible self-
denial of rigid formalism.  A court taking this approach will address only the words the legislature
has adopted, given meanings appropriate to that time, and leaving to future legislatures – courts have
no business “making law” – the correction of any problems that result.  It should be obvious
nonetheless that the court’s interpretation inevitably does “make law”; a meaning that was not
previously known as certain has now been fixed.23  And, as history has taught, the meaning assigned
by the court may be insupportably narrow, propelled by its own sense of appropriate outcome or
policy.24  That interpretation, too, will “stick” despite its palpable inadequacy unless the obstacles
to new legislation can be overcome.  Legislatures repeatedly faced with the problems thus presented,
25  Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics 28-31 (1839).  Judicial (mis)behaviors are  not the only ones
that can inspire such reactions.  Members of the legislature presumably think executive branch and agency officials also
ought to be acting as “faithful servants.”  It is not hard to  understand some recent Congresses’ extraordinary prolixity
in legislation as, at least in part, a reaction to patterns of enforcement by executive branch and  agency officials that, in
an era  often characterized by “divided government,”disappoint these expectations. 
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and attempting to avoid them for the future, may find their time consumed by the enactment of
statutes of exquisite prolixity – and corresponding incomprehensibility to the common public.
The British spirit of civil liberty induced the English judges to adhere strictly to the law, to
its exact expressions.  This again induced the law-makers to be, in their phraseology, as
explicit and minute as possible, which causes such a tautology and endless repetition in the
statutes of that country that even so eminent a statesman as Sir Robert Peel declared, in
parliament, that he "contemplates no task with so much distaste as the reading through an
ordinary act of parliament."25
Francis Lieber’s observations about the impacts of nineteenth century judicial formalism, just
quoted, are a part of the exposition that established the “faithful servant” metaphor in our rhetorical
vocabulary on the subject of statutory interpretation.  Despite its ambiguities, the metaphor captures
important aspects of the problem in its larger dimension: the necessary subservience of judges to
legislative instruction, and the enduring and interactive character of the legislative-judicial
relationship across a wide range of subjects.  It suggests, as well, a measure of success in the
relationship – that the servant does not act to create friction in the relationship; it self-consciously
takes the attitude of a fiduciary rather than an opportunist toward the inevitable slack in its
instructions. 
For some, this proposition could raise important political and institutional questions.  At what
point might the consistently successful decisions of the “servant” serve to defeat the discipline or
responsibility of his master?  Could they permit his master to avoid having to give instructions at
26  Consider, for example, the Nineteenth Century judicial development of the fellow servant exception to a
principal’s responsibilities for his agent’s torts; legislative address of the issues dealt with by such holdings as Priestly
v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch. Pleas 1837) and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R . Corp., 45 Mass. (4 M et.)
49 (1842) did not begin for decades.
27  Cf, David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1993).
28  Roscoe Pound, Spurious Legislation, 7 Colum.L.Rev. 379, 381 (1907).
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all,26 and even permit her a certain degree of laziness or evasion of responsibility.  Since the
metaphoric master here is also a servant – of the electors – and may herself be held accountable by
her masters, to an extent the judicial “servant” may not, his uninstructed resolution of issues
arguably serves to defeat the intended political controls on her behavior.  Making the legislature
decide issues is good for democracy, this argument runs – the judicial servant is answering to a
different master (the sovereign people) in refusing to do what is “properly” the legislature’s
business.27
Then there is the problem of differentiating between reasoning by analogy from the instructions
actually given, and purporting to anticipate what a contemporary legislature might do about the
problem not directly provided for. This is a tension not easy to resolve – a matter perhaps of internal
discipline or characterization.  In the Progressive Era, Roscoe Pound inveighed one year in the
Columbia Law Review against “spurious interpretation,” that “puts a meaning into the text as a
juggler puts coins ... into a dummy’s hair, to be pulled forth presently with an air of discovery.  It is
essentially a legislative, not a judicial process ... an anachronism in an age of legislation.”28  Yet the
following year, his essay in the Harvard Law Review championed as the most desirable way for
judges to “deal with a legislative innovation” receiving a statute 
“fully into the body of the law as affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle from
which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the general will, of
superior authority to judge-made rules on the same general subject; and so reason from it by
29  Roscoe Pount, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv.L.Rev. 383, 385-86 (1908).
30  See Gilmore, n. 1 above.
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analogy in preference to them.”29
This openness to dynamic interpretation was the way, he argued, to which “the course of legal
development upon which we have entered already must lead us.”  One may suppose the two
positions consistent, but difficult, in just the ways suggested here.
The argument that judges following Pound’s second, ideal course will weaken the legislative
process by dealing imaginatively and sympathetically with the statutes in hand, one colleague has
suggested, smells of the lamp.  One may perhaps be excused for thinking that on those few occasions
when judicial developments have genuinely engaged public sentiment, on abortion say, the public
has not been discouraged from holding their legislators to account by the fact that judges have
reached a conclusion.  In general, however, and from the perspective of this essay, the modal case
is not a matter in high controversy, but one of those issues of detail we could not reasonably expect
politicians will be held to answer for.30  Perhaps judicial opinion will tip the balance on a closely
contested issue – less likely as a product of its mere existence than of its reason – but if it does then
what the public presses for will have been changed, and it is unclear legislative responsibility will
have been defeated.  Given our taste for incumbency, and the volume of legislative business, the
argument that judicial decision corrodes democracy is weak at best.  
A similar question has been bruited for years as a matter of constitutional law, the “delegation”
question, and it has been argued along similar lines.  Aren’t there policy judgments so fundamental
that they must be resolved by the legislature and cannot lawfully be left to others – in this case,
executive (agency) rather than judicial officials?  In theory the answer to this question is that such
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limits do exist; in practice courts have been unable to articulate meaningful, judicially administrable
standards for enforcing them.  No one seriously argues that matters of every-day routine must be
legislatively resolved, and very few situations have provoked even individual judicial expressions
of doubt about the adequacy of legislative effort.  If it is not hard to imagine judicial reluctance to
become complicit in legislative evasions of responsibility for major issues, judicial insistence that
all issues be legislatively resolved would be insupportable.  As with delegation, minute judicial
attention to what is “properly” the legislature’s business is inconsistent with the judicial subservience
that constitutes agreed ground.  It threatens constant political struggles and imposes on the legislature
a definition of its task impossible to fulfill.  And, again, a judicially administrable standard for
distinguishing what the legislature must decide from what it may leave to others is not readily
constructed.
 Sharing the concerns Sunstein and Vermuele have expressed for institutional approaches to
interpretive issues, I conclude that a properly functioning judiciary, like Lieber’s faithful servant,
should rarely, by its own actions, create business for a contemporary legislature.  Ordinarily – that
is, absent the justifications that might be provided by an unjust order, or reliable and important
indications that judicial initiative would affirmatively encourage legislative ducking of responsibility
for political issues of central importance – the optimal interpretive approach is the one that least
often produces legislative business, because its declarations what the law “is” so well match
contemporary understandings about the law.   An interpretive approach is suboptimal to the degree
it requires the diversion of legislative resources from contemporary social problems with which the
legislature might have to deal independent of judicial actions, to matters that were not in significant
social controversy prior to judicial interpretation – that is, to social problems created by
31  For a  persuasive argument that, as a normative matter, legislation would be improved were courts to ignore the
possibility of such deals, and trea t statutes strictly in terms of their explicit public-regarding purposes, see Jon M acey,




This measure addresses the dynamics of legislative-judicial interaction in relation to the results
of adjudication, not its implications for internal legislative processes. Much of the current literature
about statutory interpretation and the problem of legislative history discusses the matter as if there
were a single statute, whose meaning had been fixed at the moment of enactment.  Implicitly if not
explicitly, the question for the court is finding that meaning, and the issues for debate concern what
(if any) bearing to give to the statute’s language, purpose and political history in performing that
task.  To the extent these commentators worry about feedback between the interpretive and
legislative process as a possible consideration influencing these interpretive choices, they present
the issue in terms of singular statutes, similarly viewed.  Thus, Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast
recently argued for careful judicial attention to the political compromises that may have persuaded
moderates to support a controversial statute, in preference to linguistic approaches that ignore these
undertakings, or purposive styles that might tend to privilege the views of the statute’s ardent
congressional supporters.  “When courts fail to respect legislative bargains,” they urge, “moderates
are deterred from compromise” and the result may be to “make[] historic social legislation less
likely.”  Yet very few statutes are controversial in this way; and for those that are, it would be hard
to establish that legislative action is much influenced by general expectations about how courts will
treat the hidden (implicit) deals they may embody.31 
Note too that this perspective accepts a “fire alarm” view of legislative activity that fits more
32  See text at n. 8 above.
33  In the words of Harlan Fiske Stone, “ to realize ... the ideal of a unified system of judge-made and statute law
woven into a seamless whole by the processes of adjudication.”  The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.L.Rev.
4 (1936).  The dominating contemporary view is that realizing this vision would be, at best, a Sisyphisean task, that
coherence in fact is not to be found.
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comfortably with Anglo-American than continental legislative traditions.32  Most often for us (as is
probably also the case in fact if not in theory on the continent) legislation shares with litigation the
quality of responding pragmatically to a single distinct social problem that has emerged against the
backdrop of contemporary law  revealed to be inadequate in some particular; much less frequently
does legislation attempt a comprehensive and theoretically grounded synthesis of an entire domain
of law.  It is typically a reaction to a particular social problem, rather than an effort to organize all
aspects of legal relations in a coherent way.  This quality produces much of the work and feel of
American statutory interpretation.  As the legislature has rarely sought reconciliation of the statute
it enacts with the existing body of statutory law, it is the judge who faces the work of reconciliation,
of creating coherence (or at least as much of it as the legislative texts will permit).33
Correspondingly, this perspective makes little distinction between the traditional domains of
statutory and common law.  If judges framing the common law of torts or contracts depart
significantly from contemporary expectations, that will produce legislative business just as judicial
[mis]applications of an aging statute will.  Both because of its institutional commitment to precedent
(i.e., the views of ages past) and because the appellate judiciary tends to be elderly, common law will
generally follow rather than lead social change.  For the same reason, some degree of legislative
modification of the common law’s content is only to be expected; but judicial resistance to such
changes has at times created the need for more (and perhaps more comprehensive) legislation than
34  As, when legislatures began at last to react against the fellow servant doctrine, and other elements developed by
common law courts in relation to workplace injury.
35  Roscoe Pound, Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 Harv.L.Rev. 365, 374 (1940); and see Gilmore,
n. 1 above.
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thoughtful judicial attention to contemporary legislative purposes and trends would have required.34
Such friction is, in my judgment, a paradigmatic example of “diversion of legislative resources from
contemporary social problems with which the legislature might have to deal independent of judicial
actions, to matters that were not in significant social controversy prior to judicial interpretation – to
social problems created by interpretation.”  Common law generation, like statutory interpretation,
is an activity that occurs subordinate to the legislative enterprise and in constant “conversational”
contact with it.  Both are susceptible of imposing higher or lower costs on the hierarchically superior
legislative enterprise, and in both cases those costs reflect a heightened level of social controversy
to which judicial law-finding (i.e., judicial law-making) contributes.  For both, worries about judges
pursuing their own ends are often voiced; and for both the best we may be able to hope for – with
some reassurance from history – is the “taught tradition”35 that the judiciary’s task is to seek the best
fit with the American project as reflected in the existing body of contemporary law, taken as a whole.
Here, then, the focus is not on the compromises that permitted enactment of a particular
controversial statute, but on a more general proposition: that the legal framework as a whole changes
as a statute ages – not only because the statute itself may previously have been interpreted, but also
as common law develops and as new statutes are enacted.  On occasion, attention to these changes
will lead a court to adopt an interpretation of particular language in an aging statute that is quite
different from the original enactors’ likely understanding, yet consistent with those changes and thus
unlikely to provoke social controversy.  Conversely, in certain cases a court can understand that its
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insistence on the meaning that can be attributed to the original enactors will likely serve to distract
legislative attention from independently existing social problems to one that this interpretation will
have generated.  
Note that this claim is a relatively weak one.  Its focus, as all judicial focus, is primarily
retrospective – on what past legislatures and courts have provided; although trends in those
provisions may unmistakably, in themselves, reveal the irreversible erosion of some principle, only
that demonstrable erosion, not anticipation of what a hierarchically superior court or legislature
might choose, can justify the abandonment of that principal.  In other settings, attention to change
will indicate no clear trend, or reveal an existing social controversy courts will lack the confidence
or sense of political place to resolve.  Thus, the claim made here does not exclude the proposition
that some issues are better left to legislatures.  But other issues, it is here asserted, can appropriately
be resolved by courts, even courts aware that, in the absence of the contemporary developments on
which it relies, a different interpretation would better fit the statute’s language.
Note, too, that the claim assumes a legal surface marked by relatively uncontroversial general
consensus at the time of judicial decision.  Its postulate was,  “[t]he optimal interpretive approach
is the one that least often produces legislative business, because its declarations what the law ‘is’ so
well match contemporary understandings about the law.”  But this way of putting it assumes a degree
of cohesion in contemporary assessment that may often be wanting.  Another distinguished group
of political science and legal scholars, John Ferejohn, Neeta Ghandi, and William Eskridge, are
developing an analysis of what they call “strategic” interpretation – again centered on federal civil
rights statutes – that focuses attention on the practical barriers to legislative correction of judicial
(mis)interpretations.  As they have persuasively shown us, the requirement that President,  House
-20-
and Senate must agree on the text of any new legislation, and the fact that any legislative act imposes
as an opportunity cost that other action must be foregone, in effect create an area of slack within
which courts can frame their interpretations without having to fear legislative correction.  They
reasonably characterize this interpretive space as one within which judges are in effect free to pursue
their personal agendas.  What is “strategic” about judges’ use of the opportunities thus presented is
that their interest in preserving the legitimacy of their function in the public’s eye over the longer
term should lead them to forego interpretations that would serve their personal ideological
preferences, but likely produce a public uproar and be successfully reversed.  This explains Justices’
occasional votes “against” stereotype; they maximize their opportunities to make interpretations a
neutral observer might think best explained by ideological preference, it is argued, by doing so only
when it is “safe.”
This way of framing matters, completely understandable in conventional “public choice” terms,
has the effect of bringing Holmes’ famous aphorism about the “bad man” and the law to bear on
judges.  Its premise is that the interest of judges lies in understanding what they can get away with
in advancing their personal ideologies – maximizing that space by strategically foregoing those
preferences that in all probability they could not successfully implant in the law for the longer term,
and thus appearing to deserve public reputations for objectivity and freedom from political agenda.
The authors present an imaginative and rigorous analysis of Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the Civil Rights statutes, that appears to demonstrate just such trimming of judicial sails when
congressional and presidential politics augur (or have recently demonstrated) likely correction of the
Justices’ preferred ideological bent, and no such trimming when they do not.
Their essay and this one share the perspective that much interpretation occurs in the context of
36  Daniel Farber makes a similar point in his contribution to the rich symposium on Eskridge’s work to be found
in “Issues in Legal Scholarship - Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,” a t www.bepress.com, Earthquakes and Tremors in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation 18 (2002).  “[T]he opinions that are  likely
to come to a law professor’s mind as typical are likely to be quite different from those that a judge or litigator would find
typical.”  At 15-16.  After a thoughtful and detailed empirical exploration of citation frequency for two Terms’ statutory
interpretation cases, Prof. Farber found that the Supreme Court opinions most frequently cited in the academic literature
involved “discrimination” and other politically “hot” issues (e.g., abortion counseling restrictions); the cases most often
cited by judges involved important procedural issues (e.g., the burden of proof in certain bankruptcy procedures).  At
11-12 and 15; nn. 48-49 and 51-52.  The academic citation patterns probably reflect considerations that move the public
generally – are a marker for political importance; the judicial citation patterns may reflect issues having a greater
operation-of-the-legal-system importance.  If one explored the  two sets independently, as neither of us has yet done, one
might well find different techniques being habitually employed, or d ifferent levels of controversiality (as expressed by
dissent frequency, the incidence of 5-4 splits, etc.).  Cf.  Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S.Ct.Rev. 231, 254.
37  See Madison, n. 22 above
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current understandings about the law and sound policy – what Professor Eskridge has long labeled
“dynamic statutory construction.”  Where they differ is in disposition to start with Holmes’ cynical
acid or not.  Their analysis constructs a general theory about interpretation on a foundation shaped
by the most difficult of cases – interpretation of statutes like the Civil Rights Act, caught up with the
deepest political struggles and divisions of our time – in the most political of courts, the Supreme
Court.  Here, the supposition is that such a data set is rather distorting.36  Descriptively, cases in the
Supreme Court are the most difficult our legal system considers, getting there only through the
obstacles and expense of repeated litigation and, finally, the Court’s affirmative choice to hear this
dispute rather than others of the thousands hopefully presented to it on petitions for the writ of
certiorari.  Normatively, a judge whose motivation is to maximize the slack within which to pursue
her personal ideology is a “bad judge” in the same sense that Holmes’s inquirer about the common
law was a “bad man”; one should be aware of her existence, even take some sensible precautions
against her,37 but understand that the general success of the system depends on the general
predominance of “good”  men and women who do not test it in this way, who generally seek the
center rather than the fringe.  
38  “What Judges Do, Part I,” discussing Collette v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital, 132 F.Supp. 2d 256  (2001).
-22-
The more usual interpretive problem, this essay posits, does not involve politically explosive
issues.  It arises in routine not exceptional cases; it requires ordinary lawyers and judges to reach
conclusions that inevitably (and desirably) are grounded in their contemporary understanding of the
legal order as a whole, as well as the specifics of the particular issue before them.  In this context,
as my colleague and U.S. District Court Judge Gerard Lynch remarked in an informal paper he
presented discussing a then-recent opinion of his,38 professional consensus about a point of
interpretation is a stabilizing element.  
By the time three [district court judges] had adopted [a particular interpretation of a narrow
statutory point,] it would be, as Arlo Guthrie tells us, a movement.  More important, at some
point it would almost certainly be “the law.”  Whether Scalia, or Easterbrook, or Posner,
would think it the correct outcome, until and unless some bold litigant managed to challenge
the consensus by taking the issue to a higher court, most lawyers would advise clients against
a claim that flew in the teeth of the “universal consensus” of the decided cases.
It’s not a question academics are likely to write about.  It’s not likely to reach the Supreme
Court (note that while the statute has been interpreted seven or eight times by trial-level
courts and the Appellate Division, nobody’s ever pushed the issue as far as the Second
Circuit or New York’s Court of Appeals).  It would just be, for lawyers and their clients, the
law.
For such issues, one need hardly add, legislative forces are unlikely to gather ... unless the eventual
invocation of a higher court produces results so discordant with the evolved consensus as to reveal
a problem where none had previously been perceived.
The claim being advanced here is a modest one – only, that the evolution of law subsequent to
a statute’s enactment is an appropriate element for consideration in interpreting it, and that judges
should be cautious in their interpretations against reaching results that are more, rather than less,
likely to require legislative correction given currently prevailing policy frameworks.  Consistent
39  Walter Gellhorn, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: Birth Pangs of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 10 Admin. L.J . Am. U . 51 (1996). 
40  The vote in the House was yeas 308 , nays 0, not voting 125. 112 Cong. Rec. 13661  (June 30, 1966). The Senate
vote was not recorded , itself a signal of consensus.
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directions taken by Congress since enactment of a statute, and apparently uncontroversial
developments in judicial interpretation, are both important data sets bearing on the question how to
interpret.  They operate properly as constraints on a judge’s formal freedom to choose among the
various meanings a particular statute’s language leaves open.  “Legislators too often write with0
stubby crayons.”
From Abstract to Concrete
These propositions can perhaps be illustrated by attention to the interaction of two statutes that
show few traces of the congressional infighting that characterized the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 [APA], and the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 [FOIA].
Although the APA was preceded by a lengthy period of study and development,39 it was not
significantly debated as legislation and it passed both houses of Congress without dissent.  FOIA,
similarly, was enacted after a good deal of consultation between the executive and legislative
branches, but without significant intra-congressional controversy.40  For both statutes, the records
suggest, virtually all legislators were ardent supporters; ardent opponents were few if any, and
conciliating legislative moderates was neither very visible nor apparently necessary.  Congress
demonstrated the strength of its commitment to FOIA, in particular, when – in reaction to what it
perceived as slow agency (and, to an extent, judicial) compliance – it strongly reiterated the policies
of the FOIA in 1974 amendments and in the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976.
Among the innovations of the APA was its articulation in what is now 5 U.S.C. §553 of a
41  5 U.S.C. §552(a)(3)(A).
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uniform procedure for notice-and-comment rulemaking.  The procedure included the following
provisions for notice, never since amended:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless
persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual
notice thereof in accordance with law.  The notice shall include— 
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;  and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved.
In neither the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual (frequently used by courts as a near-definitive marker
of legislative meaning) nor the pre-enactment legislative history does the discussion of these
provisions suggest an expectation about notice different from what these words convey – that notice
could validly be rather general and unspecific about the rule being proposed.  Note in (3) the repeated
use of the disjunctive “or” to describe the necessary content of “notice” so far as the substance of the
proposal was concerned.  “[E]ither the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved.”  It would have been surprising to have been told, in 1946, that a
necessary condition of valid rulemaking was that agencies disclose – in advance of the opportunity
for comment this notice serves to announce – the scientific data or reports known to them, and on
which the rulemaking being proposed would be likely to rely.
The APA contained no provisions by which people could require agencies to disclose any
scientific data or reports they possessed.  Such provisions first entered the statute books in 1966,
twenty years later, with the adoption of FOIA.  FOIA enabled “any person” to require an agency to
“make ... promptly available” to her all “records” that her “request ... reasonably describes.”41
42  5 U.S.C. §552(b).
43  N.L.R.B. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 142, 144 (1975) (“Sears’ rights under the Act are neither increased
nor decreased  by reason of the fact that it claims an interest in the Advice and Appeals Memoranda greater than that
shared by the average member of the public. The Act is fundamentally designed to inform the public about agency action
(continued...)
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Limited exemptions were stated, but one may say summarily here that these exemptions would reach
few if any records containing scientific data or reports an agency would consult in connection with
rulemakings.  The 1974 amendments to FOIA reflected Congress’s strong perception that agencies
had proved too resistant to FOIA disclosure generally, by adding that even if an exemption were
available for some material in a given agency record, “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record
shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt under this subsection.”42 A FOIA request for “all scientific data or reports known to the
agency to be relevant to its proposed rulemaking on X announced in the Federal Register of [date]”
would surely fit the statutory terms, “reasonably describes.”  Anyone, whether a participant in
rulemaking or not, would be able to use FOIA to obtain those records.
“Whether a participant in rulemaking or not” is an important qualification to the last sentence.
As a statutory matter, FOIA created a stand-alone remedy.  It neither required a requester’s
participation in some other administrative proceeding (or any other demonstration of need for the
documents requested, beyond curiosity about them) nor gave special standing to such participation.
The courts early and uncontroversially denied the existence of any linkage between FOIA requests
and other administrative proceedings.  While FOIA itself required very prompt agency response to
requests (a promise frequently broken, and not much enforced), parties who tried to use FOIA as a
discovery tool quickly found that doing so earned them no right to the postponement of the
proceedings they hoped to use their findings to influence.43  A requester needn’t demonstrate need
43  (...continued)
and not to benefit private litigants.”) (citations omitted); Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1,
24 (1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91  (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U .S. 136 (1967).
45  ADAPSO v. Camp, 397 U .S. 150 (1970).
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in order to invoke FOIA; yet neither could she invoke the utility of FOIA in connection with other
proceedings to delay their moving forward.  They were independent of one another.  These
conclusions sat well with Congress, which has not revisited them.
During the same period as saw enactment of FOIA and its reinforcing amendments, federal
agencies were making increasing use of APA rulemaking procedures.  To a degree unanticipated in
1946, because associated with an explosion of new statutes enacted from the mid-60's onward, they
were using rulemaking to resolve issues for which scientific and technical data and reports had great
salience – what parameters for the elements of a nuclear power plant would assure that it could
operate with safety to the public?  what parameters of time, temperature and salinity in processing
smoked fish would protect the public against botulism?  did the state of technology permit prompt
implementation of measures to reduce automobile exhaust emissions of pollutants?  should
automobiles be required to contain seat-belts or other protective apparatus and, if so, what devices,
how tested, would qualify?  This increasing use of rulemaking procedures led, in turn, to frequent
invocations of the courts for rulemaking review.  The decade 1966-1976 was marked by many
important decisions in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts interpreting the APA, most often in
the direction of heightened public participation and heightened judicial control.  
The Supreme Court’s contributions included decisions facilitating pre-enforcement review of
rulemaking,44 expansively defining the standing necessary to obtain judicial review,45 and
46  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
47  E.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. V. Federal Power Com., 209 F.2d 717, 723-24 (10 th Cir. 1953), revd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 492; California Citizens Band Ass’n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 , 49 (9 th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389
U.S. 844 (“a notice of rule making is sufficient if it provides a description of the subjects and issues involved.”).
48  E.g., Jerry Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games and
Accountability, 57 Law & Contemp. Prob. 185 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial
Controls Over Administrative Action Affecting the Community, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev 1251 (1992).
49  E.g., Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1080, 97 th Cong. (1981), which passed the Senate by a vote of 94-0 but never
made it through the House; also S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995). See Robert W. Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform,
1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 143 (1997); William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative
Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. Envtl L.J. 298 (1996).
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expansively characterizing the scope of review appropriate to decisions, like notice-and-comment
rulemaking, that were not decided on the basis of a trial-like record.46  Of each of these decisions,
one could report (a) it reflected an available but not inevitable interpretation of the statutory
language; (b) that the interpretation almost certainly fell outside the expectations of the APA’s
enactors, expectations reflected in the approximately quarter-century of intervening practice under
the statute;47 (c) that the interpretation “made sense” in light of the emergence of rulemaking as a
central policy-making tool, also unexpected in 1946; and (d) that the decision won prompt
acceptance, necessitating no legislative correction.  While academic and judicial critiques of each
have emerged over time48 as its consequences have appeared, one would be hard-pressed to find
these critiques reflected in Congress’s occasional recent efforts to amend the APA.  These
(unenacted) legislative drafts have tended to build upon, not to seek retreat from, the judicial
developments.49
In the courts of appeals, particularly the District of Columbia circuit, the APA’s skeletal
provisions for notice-and-comment procedures in rulemaking were also revisited.  For example,
litigation tested when notice may have been insufficient, because changes occurring as a
50  Wagner v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d  Cir. 1972).
51  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, n. 46 supra.
52  E.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407  F.2d 330 (D .C. Cir. 1968).
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consequence of comments filed by the public gave the adopted rule a character that could not fairly
have been anticipated from its description in the initial Federal Register proposal.50  The obligations
of review, that would presently echo through the Supreme Court’s recasting of the standard of review
for informal (i.e. non-record) adjudication,51 contributed to judicial examinations of the statements
of basis and purpose required to accompany rulemakings far more intense than one might think
called for by language describing the necessary qualities of such statements as “general and
concise”;52   these examinations could nonetheless be readily understood as a reaction to the
emerging contemporary significance of rulemaking on technologically complex and economically
significant matters.  
Of particular importance to this discussion, reviewing courts focusing on the relationship
between “facts” and agency judgments began to speak about the necessary conditions for the testing
of the factual conclusions on which rulemaking rested – the extent to which judges would take
responsibility for assuring the reasonableness of agency judgments on such matters; whether it was
necessary that agency data be revealed so that commenters could respond to the agency’s account
of the state-of-the-world; and, further, if there was to be such an opportunity for such testing, what
the procedures for that testing should be.  One can hardly doubt the quality of judicial innovation
occurring here.  In testing the adequacy of the factual grounding for challenged legislation, judges
had learned to ask only if the enacting legislature could have found a state of facts that would lend
support to its policy judgment; and the standard citation for rulemaking review, dating from the early
53  Pacific States Box and Basket v. White, 296 U.S. 176.
54  E.g., the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, P.L. 93-637, which
was the subject of extensive study and recommendations by the late Administrative Conference of the United States, see
Recommendations 79-1, 79-5, and 80-1 and their supporting reports in Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendations and Reports 1979 and 1980, 44 Fed.Reg. 38,817  (1979), 45 Fed . Reg. 2,307 and 46,772 (1980) .
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New Deal, embraced the same standard.53  It would be hard to find in the APA’s text a repudiation
of this approach.  Now, for rulemakings, courts began to demand considerably more. 
Congress was a participant in these developments, albeit less directly than would have made the
developments uncontroversially statutory in character.  The Freedom of Information Act (and its
subsequent amendments, and expansion into the Government in the Sunshine Act) voiced a strong
and unequivocal commitment to information exposure, but (as earlier remarked) this was a
commitment not explicitly linked to rulemaking as such.  In statutes establishing particular,
important rulemaking regimes, Congress increasingly provided for what came to be called “hybrid”
rulemaking procedures, that seemed a great deal more like judicial and less like legislative
procedures.54  For OSHA and for EPA, in many if not all contexts, Congress specified the basis for
judgment (e.g., “best available technology”) in ways that highlighted specific and disputable factual
findings the agency would be required to make; it provided enhanced procedures (including oral
hearings and testimony) for deciding these issues; and it specified the more demanding “substantial
evidence” standard for judicial review of the results, that is usually associated with on-the-record
proceedings.
When they encountered these special statutory provisions directly, courts had little difficulty
understanding that they imposed more rigorous standards on both agency proceedings and judicial
55  See, e.g., Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
56  E.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp ., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
57  Id.
58  462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
59  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, n. 46 above.
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review.55  There was also an observable tendency to generalize these special provisions, however,
at least to the kinds of rulemakings that shared with EPA and OSHA rulemakings the characteristics
of relatively high economic stakes for industry, technical questions of considerable uncertainty, and
the possibility of major health and safety consequences for the public.56  Moreover, in articulating
the requirements of particular interest here – the agency’s obligation to share with the public, in time
for the comment process, the data that it would consider in deciding whether to act – the courts
invoked neither special statutory language nor the APA.  They framed these obligations on the basis
of the judiciary’s own assessment what an acceptable fact-finding process entailed, often invoking
concepts of due process or fundamental fairness.57
Three D.C. Circuit decisions involving aspects of the Clean Air Act were prominent in this
particular development.  Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,58 written by Judge Harold Leventhal early
in 1972 (not long after the Supreme Court’s redefinition of the scope of judicial review)59 involved
secondary ambient air quality standards for sulfur oxides.  Congress had assigned the D.C. Circuit
special responsibilities to review challenges to such standards.  The court said these responsibilities
entailed a requirement that the agency explain its reasoning to it in a manner that gave a “sufficient
indication of the basis on which the Administrator reached” a result not obviously supported in the
rulemaking record.  While the requirement was to explain agency reasoning, rather than to give
60  478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61  At 648.
62  At 649.
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notice of data to the parties, meeting the requirement would cause the EPA to be considerably more
public about its data, and the manner in which it reasoned about it, than it had previously been.
Just a year later, Judge Leventhal wrote again in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,60
a lawsuit challenging the EPA Administrator’s refusal to suspend the coming into effect of new
automobile emission standards for a year.  Now – thanks to Kennecott – in possession of a fuller
explanation of the agency’s reasoning, he concluded that the Administrator had not successfully
shown that effective control technology would be available in time for compliance with the
standards, and remanded for further, urgent proceedings on this issue.  Reaching this conclusion
required the court to write pages of reasoning from the record and from the explanations given by
the Administrator; it characterized this extended reasoning as necessary and  “hopefully perceptive,
even as to the evidence on technical and specialized matters, ... to satisfy itself that the agency has
exercised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable
legislative intent.”61  Unsatisfied after its review, the court sought supplementation of the record.
It remarked in the course of doing so that “in the interest of justice and mutual regard for
Congressional objective, the parties should have opportunity on remand to address themselves to
matters not previously put before them by EPA for comment.” This, Judge Leventhal’s opinion  said,
should include a chance for the parties to respond to and challenge a technical appendix EPA had
created subsequent to its decision, with “some opportunity for cross-examination.”62  
These conclusions – which included sharp limitations on that opportunity to cross-examine –
63  At 651.
64  At 651-52.
65  486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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were very much the product of the particular statutory provisions under which the EPA was acting,
not the APA.  They began to acquire more general significance, however, with a concurrence by
Chief Judge David Bazelon presenting the problem as a general one for administrative law.  Chief
Judge Bazelon thought he lacked the “technical know-how” to engage in a “substantive evaluation
of the Administrator’s assumptions and methodology.”63
Whether or not traditional administrative rules [distinguishing between administrative
adjudication and administrative rulemaking] require it, the critical character of this decision
requires at the least a carefully limited right of cross-examination at the hearing and an
opportunity to challenge the assumptions and methodology underlying the decision. 
The majority's approach permits the parties to challenge the Administrator's methodology
only through the vehicle of judicial review. I do not think this is an adequate substitute for
confrontation prior to the decision. I reach this position not only out of concern for fairness
to the parties  . . .  but also out of awareness of the limits of our own competence for the task.
The petitioners' challenges to the decision force the court to deal with technical intricacies
that are beyond our ken.  These complex questions should be resolved in the crucible of
debate through the clash of informed but opposing scientific and technological viewpoints.64
Four months later, in Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckleshaus,65 Judge Leventhal again addressed
the question of party awareness, during the course of rulemaking, of the data and reports on the basis
of which EPA proposed to act under the Clean Air Act.  This case involved a rule EPA had adopted
a few weeks prior to the court’s decision in Kennecott Copper, to set Clean Air Act “stationary
source” standards for cement plants.   A petition for review of the rule had already been filed in the
D.C. Circuit when the opinion in Kennecott Copper was announced.  Reading Kennecott Copper led
EPA to publish a “supplemental statement” in the cement case.  This supplemental statement gave
66  At 379.
67  This seems inevitable, but a variety of efforts to determine the fact – including relevant FOIA requests – have thus
far proved unproductive..
68  At 402, citing Judge Leventhal’s earlier opinion in Greater Boston TV v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850, cert. denied
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
69  At 393 n. 67.
70  At 393.
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“a more specific explanation of how [the Administrator] had arrived at”66 its cement plant rule.  After
receiving the supplemental statement, one of the affected companies, presumably using FOIA,67
obtained the details of test results the statement referred to; it then successfully moved the Court of
Appeals for a remand of the record to the EPA, to permit it to comment on these tests.  It filed its
comments; the agency added them to the certified record; and EPA then returned the record to the
court without more – without issuing any response of its own or further explanation of its reasoning.
This noticeably annoyed the court, which found the agency’s explanation of its rule inadequate.  
Again, the matter was very much caught up with the particular requirements of the Clean Air
Act.  In reversing, the court reasoned largely in terms of what would be necessary to permit the
judicial review called for by that act, a review that “requires enough steeping in technical matters to
determine whether the agency ‘has exercised a reasoned discretion.’”68 Yet the court twice addressed
the APA’s general procedural requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking:
Written comments were submitted as requested, and as required by the APA § 4(c), 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c). Obviously a prerequisite to the ability to make meaningful comment is to know the
basis upon which the rule is proposed.69
and
It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the
basis of inadequate data, or on data that, critical degree, is known only to the agency.70
71  We recognize the problem posed by Judge Leventhal in International Harvester, supra, that a proceeding
might never end if such submission required a reply ad infinitum, ibid.  Here the exposure of the scientific
research relied on simply would  have required a single round of comment addressed  thereto. 
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d  Cir. 1977).
72  Richard Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of
Administrative Decisionmaking: Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 731-33 (1977). 
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 Within three years, these dicta had become “obvious” – and general – propositions about
rulemaking.  Thus, in 1977 the Second Circuit would refuse to enforce a 1970 FDA regulation
setting health standards for the processing of fish with the decisive observation that 
although we recognize that an agency may resort to its own expertise outside the record in
an informal rulemaking procedure, we do not believe that when the pertinent research
material is readily available and the agency has no special expertise on the precise parameters
involved, there is any reason to conceal the scientific data relied upon from the interested
parties.  As Judge Leventhal said in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
393 (1973):  "It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate
rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that [in] critical degree, is known only to the
agency."  (Emphasis added.)  This is not a case where the agency methodology was based
on material supplied by the interested parties themselves.  International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (1973).  Here all the scientific research was collected by the
agency, and none of it was disclosed to interested parties as the material upon which the
proposed rule would be fashioned.71
Note that the FDA had adopted the challenged rule using ordinary APA notice-and-comment
procedures, rather than statutorily created special procedures and review standards like EPA’s; and
it had done so two years before Kennecott Copper (the first of these decisions).  Judge Leventhal’s
dicta were apparently not creative judicial law-making, but simple common sense.   In 1977, too,
Professor Richard Stewart would describe the requirement that a rulemaking agency “be prepared
to expose the factual and methodological bases for its decision and face judicial review on a record
that encompasses the contentions and evidence of the Agency and its opponents” as elements of an
uncontroversial and evidently desirable “paper hearing” procedure, “a procedural tertium quid.”72
One could not call uncontroversial Chief Judge Bazelon’s preference for more adversary process,
73  P. 32 above.
74  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (Bazelon, C.J.), 68 (Leventhal, J.) (D.C. Cir. en banc), cert. denied 426 U.S.
941 (1976).
75  62 Iowa L. Rev. at 731.
76  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  The
reader is entitled to know that I was General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at the time of the D.C.
Circuit announced its decision, and participated in writing the government’s brief in the Supreme Court.
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as more reflective of judicial limitations.73  His dispute with Judge Leventhal about how judges could
best review agency resolutions of such technical matters remained a bone of contention between
them,74 and Professor Stewart characterized his views as “far more controversial.”75
When Chief Judge Bazelon found a panel to adopt his view, seeming to require the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to engage in more exacting procedures in a rulemaking on the highly
volatile and technologically complex issues of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Supreme Court
emphatically repudiated him.76  Stressing the original intent of the APA’s provisions, and the
impermissibility of judicial embroidery on the procedures it entailed, the Court’s language appeared
to place all the previous decade’s developments in jeopardy:
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, which as we have noted
elsewhere was not only "a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of procedures in many
agencies," Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), but was also a legislative
enactment which settled "long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest."  Id., at 40.  Section 4 of
the Act, 5 U.S.C. §553 (1976 ed.), dealing with rulemaking, requires in subsection (b) that
"notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register ...," describes the
contents of that notice, and goes on to require in subsection (c) that after the notice the
agency "shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation.  After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose." ...
[G]enerally speaking this section of the Act established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in
conducting rulemaking procedures.  Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights
in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them
-36-
if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.  This is not to say necessarily that there are no
circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action because of a
failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the statute.  But such circumstances,
if they exist, are extremely rare.
...  
Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the "administra-
tive agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods
of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.' " FCC v.
Schreiber, 381 U.S., at 290, quoting from FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S., at
143.  ...
[Reviewing the 1946 legislative history in some detail, the Court uncontroversially
found] little doubt that Congress intended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of
the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should be employed.
There are compelling reasons for construing §4 in this manner.  In the first place, if courts
continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the agency employed
procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored to reach what the court
perceives to be the "best" or "correct" result, judicial review would be totally unpredictable.
And the agencies, operating under this vague injunction to employ the "best" procedures and
facing the threat of reversal if they did not, would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory
procedures in every instance.  Not only would this totally disrupt the statutory scheme,
through which Congress enacted "a formula upon which opposing social and political forces
have come to rest," Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S., at 40, but all the inherent
advantages of informal rulemaking would be totally lost.
...
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this sort of review fundamentally misconceives
the nature of the standard for judicial review of an agency rule.  The court below uncritically
assumed that additional procedures will automatically result in a more adequate record
because it will give interested parties more of an opportunity to participate in and contribute
to the proceedings.  But informal rulemaking need not be based solely on the transcript of
a hearing held before an agency. ... [T]his sort of unwarranted judicial examination of
perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but seriously
interfere with that process prescribed by Congress.
Had Judge Leventhal as well as Chief Judge Bazelon, the uncontroversial as well as the
controversial, thus been repudiated?  And if not, now that attention had been drawn specifically to
the language of the APA, how could Judge Leventhal’s conclusions be justified?  Despite the
emphatic fervor of the Court’s language, the ensuing years have seen no retrenchment on the
proposition that agency data important to proposed rulemaking is to be revealed in the comment
process.  Sidestepping the rhetorical difficulties, the Court seemed to concede the survival of
77  Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
78  The decisions themselves, it is worth recalling, involved a statute, the Clean Air Act, that set rulemaking
procedures for the EPA and judicial review standards for the court of appeals that in themselves represented a
considerable elaboration of the simple notice-and-comment procedures of the APA.
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Professor Stewart’s tertium quid  when, five years later, it engaged in quite searching review of the
Department of Transportation’s technological bases as it considered a rulemaking involving the
requirement that automobiles contain passive restraints to protect their passengers.77  
While the survival of the tertium quid may be uncontroversial and unthreatened, neither the
opinions nor the literature generally have articulated a means of ascribing this result to Congress –
of presenting it as the exercise in statutory interpretation to which the Vermont Yankee Court
understandably says the judiciary is limited.  Perhaps, one could say, this is simply another of the
common law’s inelegances – that these judicial interpretations, however unjustifiable in statutory
terms, had become so engrained that the eggs could not be unscrambled.  The Bazelon view
remained controversial; it could be repudiated.  But Judge Leventhal’s elegant constructions did not
elicit the same level of controversy and a court seeking to undo them would be unraveling too much.
To make the argument in this way is nonetheless to place the result outside the statute, to justify
it simply as a judicial creation rather than as the derivative of legislative process.  Here, rather, the
suggestion is that by 1972, and certainly after the FOIA amendments of 1974, the APA’s provision
for rulemaking procedures (Section 553) could no longer be viewed as, simply, the product of the
judgments made in enacting it in 1946.  In particular, what distinguishes Judge Leventhal’s
propositions from Chief Judge Bazelon’s and permits us to see them, at least in retrospect, as APA
justified,78 is the generality and strength of the congressional judgments embodied in FOIA.
Congress never generalized its judgment that some high-consequence rulemakings should employ
79  Sunstein and Vermeule, n. 6 above at 917-18, contrast the APA, for which congressional oversight has been at
best episodic,  with other statutory frameworks such as tax law, that are characterized by continuous, detailed legislative
supervision of judicial outcomes.  Neither setting is, for them, outside the framework of interpretation, although they
understandably expect judicial awareness of congressional engagement to be a factor for consideration.
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the hybrid procedures, verging on the judicial, that Chief Judge Bazelon sought generally to enforce;
but the legislative proposition that agencies must share scientific data and studies in its possession
with the interested public – even if not directed in terms to rulemakings – was inescapable,
uncontroversial, and undifferentiated.  A court enforcing that proposition could do so with
considerable confidence that a contemporary legislature would regard it as the implementation of
its own policy judgments, not as a judicial innovation of questionable merit.79
Of course this is easier to argue in 2003 than it may have been to see in the 1970s, and it is
perhaps easier to argue for the developments respecting APA rulemaking notice than some others.
The text of the APA is unmistakably permissive, requiring only “notice” defined loosely as we have
seen, an opportunity to comment whose dimensions were explicitly left to agency discretion, and a
“concise, general” statement of basis and purpose.  Could a judge accepting that required procedures
are a matter for legislative not judicial judgment have satisfied herself at the time that changes in the
general statutory framework warranted the tertium quid’s demanding interpretations of these
statutory requirements? 
In the early part of the Twentieth Century, progressive legal scholars and judges, reacting to the
narrowness with which some judges at the time were treating the statutes emerging with increasing
volume and political force from federal and state legislatures, counseled courts to treat statutes
comparably to the way in which they treated common-law precedent.  For Dean Roscoe Pound, “the
orthodox common law attitude towards legislative innovations” was “not only [to] refuse to reason
from [a statute] by analogy and apply it directly only, but also give to it a strict and narrow
80  Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908).  Recall that this proposition must
live with Pound’s repudiation of “spurious interpretation,” p. 13 above, and in the framework of his commitment to the
“taught trtadition” of the law, p. 18 above.  He did not imagine it as a call to judicial adventurism.
81  Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 16-17 (Yale U. Press 1921). See also  François Gény,
Méthode d’Interprétation et Sources en Droit Privé Positif (1899). Gény was among the first to effectively challenge the
mechanical interpretation of statutory codes, arguing for “free scientific research” which would take legislative purpose
and policy, along with the overall social context, as essential factors in understanding and developing the application of
a statute. Gény’s ideas continue to flourish in such fields as the study of formalism and conceptualism in legal process
and doctrine, the scope and legitimate projection of legislation, the source of decision-making that rightly lies outside
the scope of legislation, and the legal realist study of the process of law-making.
82  Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 4 (1936).
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interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those cases which it covers expressly.”  Accepting that more
liberal courts already were willing to give statutes a “liberal interpretation,” he foresaw – he sought
– a day when they would “receive [a statute] fully into the body of the law as affording not only a
rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more direct
expression of the general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same general subject;
and so reason from it by analogy in preference to them.”80  Benjamin Cardozo, in The Nature of the
Judicial Process, extolled  the willingness of judges on the codified continent to “supply omissions,
correct uncertainties and harmonize results with justice through a method of free decision" that "sees
through the transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them."81  And for Justice
Stone, as well, realizing  “the ideal of a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into
a seamless whole by the processes of adjudication” entailed treating statutes “as starting points for
judicial law-making comparable to judicial decisions.”82
The Freedom of Information Act is, from this perspective, a considerably different source of
instruction than particular statutes creating special procedures for particular agencies.  Embodying
a general and strenuously reiterated policy of government obligation to make data in its possession
public, with only limited exceptions and with extraordinary indifference to the nature of the citizen’s
83  Freidrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511  (7th Cir. 1989)(per Posner, J.).
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claim, it provides an unmistakable source of the character Pound, Cardozo and Stone evoked.
Whatever rulemaking “notice” may have entailed to the drafters of 1946, in the changed rulemaking
environment of the 1960s FOIA both invited its reshaping and served to give the judge confidence
that her reshaping better fit the general framework of contemporary law.  The Congresses that
adopted FOIA and its amendments were of course not the legislators of 1946; but they were
legislators crafting a considerably more contemporary set of instructions to the judiciary, also relying
on the judges’ faithfulness as servants of the law as they understand it to be.  And judicial
understandings are – properly – compounded of contemporary understandings of the judgments
recent Congresses have made, the areas of difficulty that have emerged in recent law-administration,
and the like.  Courts need not have expected thorough revision of all laws arguably affected by laws
like FOIA.  That is not the manner in which Congress works or could credibly be made to work.
“Congressmen do not carry the statutes of the United States around in their heads any more than
judges do.”83
Just because there has been neither hesitation nor inconsistency in recent congressional action,
FOIA is a particularly easy setting in which to make an argument like this one.  The last-quoted
comment, per contra, was made in a context where one could think the congressional signals less
clear.  The issue was whether successful litigants against government authority in civil rights
litigation are entitled to reimbursement of their expenses for expert witness assistance as well as their
attorneys fees. Congress had sometimes provided explicitly for reimbursement of experts, and
sometimes had used a formula such as “reasonable attorneys fees as a part of the costs,” not
specifying what the other costs might be.  These expressions had occurred as elements of an
84  Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2); Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988; Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §794a(b); Maher v. Gagne, 448  U.S. 122 (1980); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984); Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511  (7th Cir.
1989); West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 489 U.S. 83 (1991); Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991,
42 U.S.C. §1988(c); Neosho R-V School Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8 th Cir. 2003).
85  See Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain M eaning, West
Virginia Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 687  (1992); Neosho R-V
School Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8 th Cir. 2003) is a quite recent revisiting of the matter in a compelling context.
86  West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 489 U.S. 83,   . (1991).
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extended judicial-legislative “argument” about proper reimbursement policies in which attorneys’
fees appeared to be the central element at first, and limitations on other permitted costs emerged only
with time.84  The specific references to expert witness fees multiplied as those limitations did, and
tended to cluster in legislation developed by legislative committees with environmental
responsibilities.  This is not the place to chronicle that dispute or its outcome.85  Note, however, in
the following passage from the majority opinion sharply repudiating the last-quoted comment 86 a
certain ambivalence between dynamic and static approaches to interpretation:
This argument profoundly mistakes our role. Where a statutory term presented to us for
the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits
most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted
law.  We do so not because that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must
have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress know what a later Congress would enact?)
but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.  But
where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not our function
to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy, and to treat alike subjects that
different Congresses have chosen to treat differently.  ...  Where what is at issue is not a
contradictory disposition within the same enactment, but merely a difference between the
more parsimonious policy of an earlier enactment and the more generous policy of a later
one, there is no more basis for saying that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the
earlier Congress felt differently. In such circumstances, the attribution of forgetfulness rests
in reality upon the judge's assessment that the later statute contains the better disposition. But
that is not for judges to prescribe.  We thus reject this last argument for the same reason that
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, once rejected a similar (though less explicit)
argument by the United States:
87  WV UH at least asks us to  guess the  preferences of the enacting Congress. JUSTICE STEVENS apparently believes
our role is to guess the desires of the present Congress, or of Congresses yet to be. "Only time will tell," he says, "whether
the Court, with its literal reading of §1988 , has correctly interpreted the will of Congress."   The implication is that today's
holding will be proved wrong if Congress amends the law to conform with his dissent. W e think no t. The "will of Con-
gress" we look to is not a will evolving from Session to Session, but a will expressed  and fixed in a particular  enactment.
Otherwise, we would speak not of "interpreting" the law but of "intuiting" or "predicting" it.  Our role is to say what the
law, as hitherto enacted, is; not to forecast what the law, as amended, will be.
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 [The statute's] language is plain and unambiguous. What the Government asks is not
a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that
what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To
supply omissions transcends the judicial function." Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S.
245, 250-251 (1926).87
No more violence would have been done to statutory words – particularly in the context of the
judicial practice common when they were enacted and the subsequent legislative history – by treating
expert witness fees as an element of permission to award “reasonable attorneys fees as part of the
costs” than not.  The remark that
where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not our function
to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy, and to treat alike subjects that
different Congresses have chosen to treat differently
is in my judgment better understood as a commitment to the Court majority’s strong policy
preferences, frequently reiterated in its “dialogue” with Congress over the years, than as a necessary
proposition about the language Congress had used or the choices it had advertently made.  And the
Court’s quotation from Justice Brandeis, with its accompanying footnote, seems to retract the
preceding remarks’ seeming openness to dynamic interpretation building on subsequent legislation;
it appears grounded in the proposition that statutes must be treated as “static” documents, the product
only of the Congress that enacted them.  A “faithful servant,” observing repeated instructions of the
same general nature but increasing specificity, could conclude that it had been his interpretation of
the “earlier enactment,” not the enactment itself, that had been “parsimonious” – the “more generous
88  See Strauss, n. 4 above.
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policy” of later laws being not a new thought, but a further specification of earlier instructions.
Of course courts will encounter difficulties in distinguishing congressional responses on the
order of “what the hell?” from “oops.”  Nonetheless, acknowledging that the judicial responsibility
is to Congress’s judgments (not to what the judge herself prefers as “the better disposition”), it is
submitted that the judicial obligation is to try.  And if the judge finds herself in repeated
conversations of this character, she ought to entertain the thought that her understandings have been
deficient – indeed, perhaps animated by the same choice of her own preferences as this passage so
emphatically repudiates.
Particularly at the Supreme Court level, the certiorari function has converted Justice Brandeis’
proposition into an amiable fiction that conceals the Court’s considerable and disruptive law-making
power.88  The language quoted from WVUH refers to “ a statutory term presented to us for the first
time” (emphasis added).  Yet under the present realities that presentation will ordinarily be greatly
delayed in relation to its presentation in the legal order.  Indeed, the delay may be substantially
ascribable to choices by parties and the Court itself that the matter does not warrant the Court’s
attention.  Brandeis uttered his dictum before the business of federal courts had become dominated
by statutes, before their dockets had exploded, and before the certiorari function had taken effect.
The dominant characteristic of particular statutory issues in the Court today is that they are very
infrequently, and usually tardily, presented.  The Court’s certiorari choices, like the contemporary
Congress’s legislative choices, are driven by the disputes that are live and important at any given
moment.  If the uncontroversial is not “presented to us,” it nonetheless becomes a part of the living
law known to lawyers advising clients, to Congress choosing its legislative opportunities, to agencies
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deciding how to make procedural choices, and to lower courts that cannot so easily evade the
responsibilities of decision.  Were the Court honestly to face the implications of its reservation of
authority to choose which statutory issues to consider, it might conclude that its refusal to credit
intervening statutory and lower court case-law developments, more than its insistence on a static
view, “profoundly mistakes” its proper contemporary role.  
